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Equilibria in a Search Model
Abstract:
Unemployment varies strongly between countries with comparable economic structure.
Some economists have tried to explain these differences with institutional differences in the
labour market. Instead, this paper focuses on a model with multiple equilibria so that the
same socioeconomic structure can give rise to different levels of unemployment.
Unemployed workers' search efficiency are modelled within an equilibrium search model and
lay behind these results. In the model learned helplessness causes a pro-cyclical behavior
of the aggregate search efficiency, also known as the discouraged worker effect. The model
can distinguish between locally stable and unstable labour market equilibria. The analysis
shows that if a shock in an antecedent variable brings unemployment above the unstable
equilibrium, the economy will eventually stabilize in a state with an even higher level of
unemployment. However, a shock that brings the variable back at its initial level will not be
enough to bring unemployment back at the lower equilibrium. Hence, the model also offers
an explanation of why unemployment seems to move more easily up than down.
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